Το χάσμα του ΔΝΤ με τους ευρωπαϊκούς θεσμούς και την εσωτερική στρατηγική του Ταμείου προκειμένου να αναγκάσει την Ελλάδα να δεχτεί νέα σκληρά μέτρα με την απειλή της χρεοκοπίας αποκαλύπτει το WikiLeaks διαρρέοντας τηλεφωνική συνομιλία του Διευθυντή Ευρωπαϊκών Υποθέσεων Πολ Τόμσεν με την εκπρόσωπο του Ταμείου στο κουαρτέτο Ντέλια Βελκουλέσκου και την υπεύθυνη της τεχνικής ομάδας του Ταμείου ίβα Πέτροβα.
Ο Πολ Τόμσεν φέρεται να προσπαθεί να μην επιστρέψει το ΔΝΤ στην Ελλάδα, ώστε να καθυστερήσει η αξιολόγηση μέχρι τον Ιούλιο, η Αθήνα να μείνει χωρίς λεφτά και να υποχρεωθεί να δεχτεί τις απαιτήσεις του ΔΝΤ για νέα σκληρά μέτρα, που δεν προβλέπονται στη συμφωνία.
..Όπως προκύπτει από τη συνομιλία, ο επικεφαλής του ΔΝΤ για την Ευρώπη, προωθεί να παρθούν μέτρα για τη συμφωνία και επιπλέον μέτρα για τη ρύθμιση του χρέους. Προαναγγέλλει δε ότι το ΔΝΤ θα αρνηθεί να συμφωνήσει στην αξιολόγηση και δεν θα δεχθεί μικρό πακέτο μέτρων.
Αυτό που ουσιαστικά προτείνει είναι η Ελλάδα να βρεθεί με την πλάτη στον τοίχο, να τελειώνουν τα λεφτά και να είναι έτοιμη να χρεοκοπήσει, να βρεθεί ενόψει πιστωτικού γεγονότος, προκειμένου να υποχρεωθεί να πάρει τα μέτρα όπως τα θέλει το ΔΝΤ.
Έτσι, η συζήτηση για την αξιολόγηση θα πάει μέχρι τον Ιούλιο, ώστε να συμπέσει με το δημοψήφισμα για το Brexit και οι Ευρωπαίοι να καθυστερούν, αφού δεν θα θέλουν να πάρουν αποφάσεις πριν το βρετανικό δημοψήφισμα.
Αποκαλύπτει, επίσης, ότι σχεδιάζει να εκβιάσει την Άγγελα Μέρκελ με την αποχώρηση του ΔΝΤ από το πρόγραμμα, η οποία θα προκαλέσει ενοχλητικές ερωτήσεις στη γερμανική Βουλή.
Από τη μεριά της, η Ντέλια Βελκουλέσκου λέει ότι ήταν λάθος τους η Συμφωνία του Ιουλίου, καθώς δίνει στην Ελλάδα ένα πολύ δυνατό επιχείρημα να μην δέχονται τα επιπλέον μέτρα που ζητά το ΔΝΤ, ότι οφείλουν να εφαρμόσουν μόνο όσα συμφώνησαν και τίποτα παραπάνω.
Λέει, επίσης, ότι έπρεπε να έχουν βάλει στους Έλληνες πολύ χειρότερους στόχους, ουσιαστικά επιβεβαιώνοντας την τεράστια διαπραγματευτική επιτυχία της Ελλάδας με τη Συμφωνία του περασμένου καλοκαιριού.
Τι απαντάει η ελληνική πλευρά
«Δε θα παίξουμε με τη φωτιά, δε θα αφήσουμε κανέναν να διαλύσει την Ευρώπη χρησιμοποιώντας την Ελλάδα» είπε στο euronews ανώτατη κυβερνητική πηγή και πρόσθεσε με νόημα ότι «οποιαδήποτε έκθεση του ΔΝΤ είναι πια de facto αναξιόπιστη».
Η κυβερνητική εκπρόσωπος Όλγα Γεροβασίλη ζήτησε εξηγήσεις από το ΔΝΤ «Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση ζητά εξηγήσεις από το ΔΝΤ για το αν η επιδίωξη δημιουργίας συνθηκών χρεοκοπίας στην Ελλάδα λίγο πριν το δημοψήφισμα στη Μεγάλη Βρετανία αποτελεί την επίσημη θέση του Ταμείου»
Όλη η απομαγνητοφωνημένη συνομιλία της 19ης Μαρτίου που διέρρευσε το WikiLeaks.
πηγη
by Julian Assange
Today, 2nd April 2016, WikiLeaks publishes the records of a 19 March 2016 teleconference between the top two IMF officials in charge of managing the Greek debt crisis - Poul Thomsen, the head of the IMF's European Department, and Delia Velkouleskou, the IMF Mission Chief for Greece. The IMF anticipates a possible Greek default co-inciding with the United Kingdom's referendum on whether it should leave the European Union ('Brexit').
"This is going to be a disaster" remarks Velkouleskou in the meeting.
According to the internal discussion, the IMF is planning to tell Germany that it will abandon the Troika (composed of the IMF, European Commission and the European Central Bank) if the IMF and the Commission fail to reach an agreement on Greek debt relief.
Thomsen: "Look you, Mrs. Merkel, you face a question: you have to think about what is more costly, to go ahead without the IMF--would the Bundestag say 'The IMF is not on board?', or [to] pick the debt relief that we think that Greece needs in order to keep us on board?"
Remaining in the Troika seems an increasingly hard sell internally for the IMF, because non-European IMF creditor countries view the IMF's position on Greece as a violation of its policies elsewhere of not making loans to countries with unsustainable debts.
In August the IMF announced it would not participate in last year's €86 billion Greek bailout, which was covered by EU member states. IMF Chief Christine Lagarde stated at the time that the IMF's future participation was contingent on Greece receiving "significant debt relief" from creditors. Lagarde announced that a team would be sent to Greece, headed by Velkouleskou.
Thomsen said internally that the threat of an imminent financial catstrophe is needed to force the other players into a "decision point". For Germany, on debt relief, and In the case of Greece, to accept the IMF's austerity "measures," -- including raising taxes and cutting Greek pensions and working conditions. However the UK "Brexit" referendum in late June will paralyse European decision making at the critical moment.
"I am not going accept a package of small measures. I am not..." said Thomsen. "What is going to bring it all to a decision point? In the past there has been only one time when the decision has been made and then that was when [the Greeks] were about to run out of money seriously and to default. [...] And possibly this is what is going to happen again. In that case, it drags on until July, and clearly the Europeans are not going to have any discussions for a month before the Brexits..."
Last year Greek Finance Minister Tsakalotos accused the IMF of imposing "draconian measures," including on pension reform. While Velkouleskou concedes in the meeting that "What is interesting though is that [Greece] did give in... they did give a little bit on both the income tax reform and on the.... both on the tax credit and the supplementary pensions."
But Thomsen's view is that the Greeks "are not even getting close [to coming] around to accept[ing] our views." Velkouleskou argues that "if [the Greek government] get pressured enough, they would... But they don't have any incentive and they know that the Commission is willing to compromise, so that is the problem."
Velkouleskou: "We went into this negotiation with the wrong strategy, because we negotiated with the Commission a minimal position and we cannot go further [whereas] the Commission is just starting from this one and is willing to go much further. So, that is the problem. We didn't negotiate with the Commission and then put to the Greeks something much worse, we put to the Greeks the minimum that we were willing to consider and now the Greeks are saying [that] we are not negotiating."
While the Commission insists on a Primary Government Budget Surplus (total tax minus all government expenditure excluding debt repayments) of 3.5%; the IMF thinks that this target should be set at 1.5% of GDP. As Thomsen puts it, "if [Greece] come around to give us 2.5% [of GDP in tax hikes and pension-wage-benefits cuts]... we should be fully behind them." -- meaning that the IMF would, in exchange for this fresh austerity package, support the reduction of the Primary Surplus Target imposed upon them from the 3.5% that the European Commission insists on to 1.5%.
These targets are described as "very crucial" to the IMF. The IMF officials ask Thomsen "to reinforce the message about the agreement on the 2.5%, because that is not permeating and it is not sinking very well with the Commission."
At one point, Velkouleskou refers to an unusual solution: to split the problem into two programs with two different targets: "The question is whether [the Europeans] could accept the medium term targets of the Commission, for the purposes of the program, and our targets for the purposes of debt relief." Thomsen further explains that "They essentially need to agree to make our targets the baseline and then have something in that they hope that will overperform. But if they don't, they will still disburse."
The EWG [Euro Working Group] needs to "take a stand on whether they believe our projections or the Commission's projections." The IMF's growth projections are the exact opposite of the Commission's. The Commission projects a GDP growth of 0.5%, and the IMF a GDP decline of 0.5% (even if Greece accepts all the measures imposed by the IMF).
Title: 19 March 2016 IMF Teleconference on Greece
-------- Mensaje reenviado --------
De: [redacted]@[redacted].es
Fecha: XX de marzo de 2016 XX:XX:XX GMT+1
Para: [redacted]@[redacted].es
Asunto: Re: Reunión de 19 de marzo
CC: [redacted]
[811_0221.MP3]
[Transcript of attachment by WikiLeaks]
Participants:
•
DELIA VELKOULESKOU, Head of IMF Representative Mission to Greece
•
POUL THOMSEN, Director of the IMF’s European Department
•
IVA PETROVA, IMF
THOMSEN: The thing that I am worried about is that we are setting a date for the return of the
mission, when we might not have an agreement inside the Troika on how to proceed.
VELKOULESKOU: But Poul, you suggested this, so it is very hard to go back now on it.
THOMSEN: How are we going to pitch this? What are we going to do?
VELKOULESKOU: I don't know. Of course I don't want to come back so soon. I don't think that in
two weeks, or in ten days we will be able to make more progress than we are now. But I feel
that otherwise, we would have been stuck here in this situation anyway. And I feel that for
this next mission that, at least the Europeans, are planning to... they have a deadline right?
They are planning to finish one way or another by the spring meetings because of these
presumed talks on debt that are going to take place by the spring meetings. So I don't know.
I feel that this pressure will come anyway at some point on us, so... I don't know. I don't see
how this is going to evolve, but we will have to come here at some point...
THOMSEN: But why? I mean, we can ... We should have another meeting like we had in Brussels
and agree on how to proceed...
VELKOULESKOU: We can do that, and we can have another document remotely, but we know it
doesn't work Poul, because these guys agree on something and then they give it up the next
day. We have said this time and again, we know that they don't do what we say: that we get
up and leave together. It just doesn't function. For them everything is subject to change--if
the authorities want it.
THOMSEN: Can you change it so that it doesn't have a specific date? For say, early April?
VELKOULESKOU: This is going to be a disaster, if I try to do this tomorrow. They will not let us
go.
THOMSEN: Well, they have already let you go...so that's... haha.
VELKOULESKOU: I think Poul you need to discuss this at your level. I mean it will come back...I
think.. I don't know whether we can avoid doing that at this stage.
THOMSEN: You mean going back?
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah.
PETROVA: Poul, I think that it is more important to reinforce the message about the agreement on
the 2.5%, because that is not permeating and it is not sinking very well with the
Commission. If they stick to this agreement, I think that coming on the 2nd of April will be
fine. But, on our side, going back on this date will really be a disaster.
THOMSEN: Well, you just blame it on me, that's fine. When do they want to finish that mission?
VELKOULESKOU: They want to finish that mission ideally by the 8th of April, so just a week. Or
by the 12th or the 13th. Remember on the 6th and 7th of April they want to have this
Washington Group debt meeting on the sidelines of the EWG [Eurogroup Working Group],
and then....
THOMSEN: So that means you have to finish by the 6th...
VELKOULESKOU: No, no, no. We can report progress on that EWG [Eurogroup Working Group]
and basically we need to have this debt discussion that prepares the Ministers for the
following week, when they are thinking about April 15th or 16th, on the sidelines of our
Spring meetings. So, essentially they want to finish...
THOMSEN: Yeah, but our Spring meetings start in the middle of the week of the 11th. That means
that you have to finish there by the 8th or 9th and be back by then.
VELKOULESKOU: Exactly we would need to finish by the.. no.. 11th or 12th or so and then fly
directly to D.C. And we can finish with an agreement or not, I mean we may can end up
where we are now in a way. And yes there will be a huge amount of pressure and we want to
see how we will deal with it.
THOMSEN: That's what the block is about, right?
VELKOULESKOU: That's right, that's right. That's why we need to have it out - I agree with you -
as soon as possible. The Greek press is full of acusations against us, of the income tax credit
and all of that, is here every day. The other thing though that is not clear to me is how it will
pan out, is this discussion on the target. On the 3.5 versus the 1.5 because for us this is also
very crucial.
THOMSEN: I can tell you how that is going to turn out. There is no way that the member states are
going to accept to lower the target for the program. This means that we will say that it does
not add up.
VELKOULESKOU: But can we do what you suggested? Have two programs with two targets?
Even for the medium run?
THOMSEN: Yes, if the Europeans say that it is our target that matters for their disbursement for
debt relief--but they are not going to say that.
VELKOULESKOU: The question is whether they could accept the medium term targets as the
Commission, for the purposes of the program, and our targets for the purposes of debt relief.
THOMSEN: Wait a minute that's not... for sure they need to accept our targets for the debt relief.
But if you go out and say for this year for instance you say they will end up with what you
say, -0.5, -1 or something like that?
VELKOULESKOU: ... -0.5 let's say, if they do all the measures.
THOMSEN: Ok, let's say -0.5 and the Commission will say that they end up with zero or +0.25 or
whatever they have...
VELKOULESKOU: ... +0.5...
THOMSEN: Yes... you don't have a finance program. Because they are time financing for
something that you say is not going to happen.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah...
THOMSEN: So the program is not financed and contingent debt relief... the debt relief is not
coming either, because they are not on track to meet the criteria. That is the whole point.
They essentially need to agree to make OUR targets the baseline and then have something in
that they hope that will overperform. But if they don't, they will still disburse. Right?
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, that's right.
THOMSEN: They are not going to agree to that.
VELKOULESKOU: No. The first question is when is this thing going to be even discussed. Right?
Somebody needs to discuss it. I know Thomas Wieser is setting up a call on the 30th of this
month.
THOMSEN: A call with whom?
VELKOULESKOU: I think it is an EWG call. An EWG call on Greece.. on status or something like
that. Yeah, we need to ask Thomas.
THOMSEN: I mean.. he's not gonna... he can set up all the calls he wants, but I know what is going
to happen. We are going to go to the EWG, and I am going to say at the Eurogroup that
"This does not add up to 3.5 and we will not go ahead, unless the Europeans lower their
targets to 1.5, as far as spacing the disbursements are concerned". They are not going to do
that. They are going to say no, stack more measures. That's clear, I have no doubt about that.
VELKOULESKOU: I don't know whether they are going to say that, that is the question. They need
to take a stand on whether they believe our projections or the Commission's projections.
THOMSEN: It is clear that they will just keep the ball in play... and send the mission back.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, but we will do what? Because, even if we agree on this 2.5, we are still
not there unless the targets are agreed.
Paul THOMSEN: Well, then they will send you back to find more hard measures and try to find a
compromise. That is exactly why I am doing this like this. Let's get those 2.5% under the
belly, and I am sure they will press for some more measures from some of the member
states. We will of course say, I will say that "I don't think it is possible", I will say that "I
think we should base the program on 1.5", but I have no doubt that they will push us to go
out there.
VELKOULESKOU: So in any case we need to come back and try to get this 2.5, and this is just in
the first stage as you say. Once it is in the next stage, you know, it's not enough for that.
THOMSEN: For sure Delia, that is the definition. I don't like to have you guys hanging out there, if
there is no agreement on how to proceed.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, of course. We don't want to be in that situation.
THOMSEN: We need to think about when you come back... we should just put on the table what we
want.
VELKOULESKOU: We should.
THOMSEN: Instead of waiting for them... I am not going accept a package of small measures. I am
not.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, no, understood. We have told them, it is very clear what we have and
what we have in this note that we agreed with the Europeans--which they are now
backtracking--but it is very simple it is the pension reform, income tax credit, VAT and the
wage bill and there are some excises, one or two... that's it. But on each of them we have
significant open issues which are all political, as far as Greeks are concerned. And the other
question is about the DSA [Debt Sustainability Analysis] and whether we will put it out at
some point.
THOMSEN: Well, I don't know. But this is... I think about it differently. What is going to bring it all
to a decision point? In the past there has been only one time when the decision has been
made and then that was when they were about to run out of money seriously and to default.
Right?
VELKOULESKOU: Right!
THOMSEN: And possibly this is what is going to happen again. In that case, it drags on until July,
and clearly the Europeans are not going to have any discussions for a month before the
Brexits and so, at some stage they will want to take a break and then they want to start again
after the European referendum.
VELKOULESKOU: That's right.
THOMSEN: That is one possibility. Another possibility is one that I thought would have happened
already and I am surprised that it has not happened, is that, because of the refugee situation,
they take a decision... that they want to come to a conclusion. Ok? And the Germans raise
the issue of the management... and basically we at that time say "Look, you Mrs. Merkel you
face a question, you have to think about what is more costly: to go ahead without the IMF,
would the Bundestag say 'The IMF is not on board'? or to pick the debt relief that we think
that Greece needs in order to keep us on board?" Right? That is really the issue.
VELKOULESKOU: Correct!
VELKOULESKOU: When is that going to happen? I don't know, I am surprised that it has not
happened yet. I would, for the sake of the Greeks and everyone else, I would like it to
happen sooner rather than later.
VELKOULESKOU: I am hoping it's going to happen with these debt discussions that are starting in
mid April.
THOMSEN: But that is not an event. That is not going to cause them to... That discussion can go on
for a long time. And they are just leading them down the road... why are they leading them
down the road? Because they are not close to the event, whatever it is.
VELKOULESKOU: I agree that we need an event, but I don't know what that will be. But I think
Dijsselbloem is trying not to generate an event, but to jump start this discussion somehow
on debt, that essentially is about us being on board or not at the end of the day.
THOMSEN: Yeah, but you know, that discussion of the measures and the discussion of the debt can
go on forever, until some high up.. until they hit the July payment or until the leaders decide
that we need to come to an agreement. But there is nothing in there that otherwise is going
to force a compromise. Right? It is going to go on forever.
VELKOULESKOU: It will, yes, until July, if nothing happens beforehand. I agree.
THOMSEN: OK. I don't know, let's see. I hope for the sake of the Greeks that we are going to find
a solution soon... I mean, let's face it, you guys are not going agreeon ... these discussions
that you have out there, they're not going to lead to... they are not going to come around to
accept our views. Right? They are not!
VELKOULESKOU: No, they are not...
THOMSEN: And they are not even getting close. Right?
VELKOULESKOU: They are not getting close. What is interesting though is that they did give in...
they did give a little bit on both the income tax reform and on the.... both on the tax credit
and the supplementary pensions. They are doing something but it is very small...
THOMSEN: Well, if they come around to give us the 2.5% and not on Mickey Mouse stuff, we
should be fully behind them.
VELKOULESKOU: I agree. There is a scenario out there that they get pressured enough, that they
would... I think actually politically for them it is possible to give on both of these things. But
they don't have any incentive and they know that the Commission is willing to compromise,
so that is the problem. In a way we went into this negotiation with the wrong strategy,
because we negotiated with the Commission a minimal position and we cannot go further
and the Commission is just starting from this one and is willing to go much further. So, that
is the problem. We didn't negotiate with the Commission and then put to the Greeks
something much worse, we put to the Greeks the minimum that we were willing to consider
and now the Greeks are saying "Well we are not negotiating". I agree with your concern that
this date is bad for us because we will get stuck as you say, so we need to think about it
when we are back.
THOMSEN: They only comfort I have is that you cannot hang out there forever. You will have to
wrap it up before the spring meetings.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, we need an agreement with the Europeans of an exit date. We need to
make it very explicit with the Europeans and with the Greeks, before we go back.
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